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Abstract 
The current global “war on terror” highlights a fundamental quandary for all liberal 
democracies seeking to counter the violent extremism of their own citizens while maintaining 
civic rights and freedoms. This challenge accompanies a transformation in international 
conflict from inter-state war and superpower rivalry, to homegrown terrorism, radicalization-
to-violence, Internet propaganda, and targeting and recruitment of vulnerable persons. These 
new threats shift the battlefield, as traditionally defined, to the home front, as extremist 
violence is nurtured by and perpetrated within public spaces, such as schools, places of 
religious worship, civil society and the home. Today, violence emanates from within liberal 
democratic society and its extremist motivations bypass the very institutions that would 
otherwise support civic rights, freedoms and multiculturalism. As such, attempts to counter 
extremist violence must appeal to the political, social, cultural, religious and familial aspects 
of human behavior alongside a parallel shift in efforts to keep citizens safe within their own 
social spaces. In recent years, Canada has been introduced to home grown and lone individual 
terrorism with the cases of attack against armed forces personnel in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu 
and Ottawa in 2014. This article identifies the social dimensions of counter-terrorism in the 
Canadian context, a propitious case by which to evaluate different approaches to countering 
violent extremism. Canadian initiatives - simultaneously proliferating and in their infancy – 
raise a host of questions about counter-terrorism in liberal democratic countries. For example, 
why do individuals radicalize-to-violence in rights-based and multicultural societies? How 
and when can the liberal democratic state best temper the radicalization process in ways that 
are effective and procedurally just? What state-society balance works best to counter 
radicalized viewpoints? Who are the appropriate stakeholders in mounting and monitoring 
counter radicalization programs? What risks accompany government engagement with 
communities against terrorist activity? And what are the appropriate measures of success? 
These questions lay the groundwork for an empirical analysis of prevalent programs in 
Canada against the background of the “war on terror”, multiculturalism, racial profiling, 
community policing and other contemporary Canadian values. 
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Introduction: 
The weak don’t win wars, but lately neither do the strong.2 The current global war on 
terrorism is marred by this unbearable stalemate. States can no longer rely on the 
sophisticated weaponry they used during the Cold War to fend off the kinds of attacks 
currently being waged. Emerging trends in terrorism and counter-terrorism (CT) have 
exposed new dimensions of international conflict for which conventional protection systems 
do not apply. The impetus for national security, once dominated by the logic of superpower 
rivalries and wars between states, has recently been offset by the acts of isolated civilians 
wreaking havoc in their own societies with little power, as traditionally defined, at their 
disposal. Today, topping the security agenda of states are threats of homegrown terrorism, 
lone actors, radicalization-to-violence, Internet propaganda, targeting and recruitment of 
vulnerable persons. These phenomena appeal to the political, social, cultural, religious and 
familial aspects of human behavior and as such, require comprehensive and multidimensional 
approaches towards their resolution. Societies currently struggle for security from within as 
attacks increasingly manifest as smaller, decentralized, local, diffuse, and perpetrated by 
individuals (often called “lone wolves”) embedded in social networks but outside the 
institutionalized political process.  
 
In recent years, Canada too has faced the threat of home grown and lone actor terrorism with 
the cases of attack against armed forces personnel in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu and at the 
National War Memorial/parliament buildings in Ottawa in 2014. Alternatively, a growing 
number of Canadians have expressed interest in travel or have already travelled to join ISIS 
(Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria) in the Middle East.3 This new type of conflict zone 
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presupposes a shift from the battlefield - as traditionally defined - to the home front, i.e., 
public spaces in which radicalization to violence occurs, such as in schools, places of 
religious worship, community centers, prisons, hospitals, and voluntary associations. These 
are places where the vast majority of citizens congregate during their free time, express their 
views, develop a sense of belonging and mold collective identities around fundamental belief 
systems. The recent spate of terrorist attacks has fundamentally altered discussions in Canada 
about how to combat the threat of terrorism within Canadian society, when to intervene in the 
process of radicalization, and who should be involved in operationalizing counter-terrorism 
and deradicalization strategy. 
 
The purpose of this article is to identify the social dimensions of counter-terrorism in the 
Canadian context. Canada is a propitious case by which to evaluate different approaches to 
countering violent extremism since such programs are simultaneously proliferating and in 
their infancy. The Canadian context raises a host of important questions: Why do individuals 
radicalize-to-violence? How and when can the liberal democratic state best intervene in the 
radicalization process in ways that are effective and procedurally just? What state-society 
balance works best to counter radicalized viewpoints? Who are the appropriate stakeholders 
in mounting and monitoring deradicalization programs? What risks accompany government 
engagement with communities against terrorist activity? And what are the appropriate 
measures of success? This discussion refers to the threat of Islamist extremism in particular, 
but many of its principles can equally relate to other forms of extremism such as neo-Nazi 
hate and single issue groups, which are beyond the purview of this analysis. The remainder of 
this article is organized as follows: Part II provides an overview of the convergence of old and 
emerging trends in counter-terrorism as a foundation in Part III by which to analyze the social 
dimensions of deradicalization in Canada. Part IV critically evaluates deradicalization 
programs that have been launched in various Canadian cities and provinces in recent years. 
And the final part draws conclusions and directions for future research and public policy.  
 
Part II: Old and Emerging Trends in Counter-Terrorism (CT): 
Emerging trends in CT have culminated from the convergence of two longstanding paradigms 
in critical security studies that engendered broader and more inclusive understandings of 
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security: human security and asymmetrical warfare. Both paradigms offer alternative 
assumptions about the referent object and agent of security that have found firm footing 
against emerging threats and insecurities.4 Conventional protection systems that promote 
national security to defend citizens from external military attack have proven increasingly 
futile against prevailing threats. Over the last few decades, violence has spilled over and 
eradicated the boundaries of conventional battlefields, threatening the lives of ordinary 
citizens and complicating the routine functioning of their democratic institutions. Responding 
to these threats is highly problematic. Over time, democracies run the risk of mirroring the 
changes they adopt to fight conditions of violent attrition. Military, economic and even 
political power, do not then imply victory, particularly when the disparity in power is very 
large. Liberal democracies combat terrorism within the limitations of political, legal and 
social conventions. Fear-mongering, radicalization, suspension of civil liberties, emergency 
legislation, racial profiling, increased surveillance and political backlash are the unenviable 
side-effects of combating terrorism from within. These effects underpin the terrorist’s very 
attempt to render routine life unbearable for the majority of society’s members. 
 
(1) Human Security: 
Human security is a key concept in understanding the current focus of counter-terrorism 
efforts on the safety and security of individuals and communities. First coined in a 1994 
report of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), human security was promoted 
throughout the 1990s by then Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy. Axworthy led 
like-minded countries through the United Nations in reinforcing human security as the 
cornerstone of a new foreign policy agenda including political, social, economic, 
environmental, military, and cultural issues. According to a 2012 United Nations policy 
statement entitled “Human Security at the United Nations”, human security was characterized 
as (1) people-centered, (2) comprehensive, (3) context-specific, (4) prevention oriented and 
(5) protective (top-down) and empowering (bottom-up).5 These components link recognition 
of threats to the socially embedded individual and society’s role in countering threats. 
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The global community proceeded to operationalize the concept of human security in various 
endeavors, including the adoption in December 1997 of the Ottawa Convention banning the 
production, use, stockpiling and transfer of anti-personnel landmines, and the 1998 signing of 
the landmines treaty for which Mr. Axworthy was nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize.6 
Human security incorporated a vast number of challenges including child soldiers, 
humanitarian intervention, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), establishment of an International 
Criminal Court and sustainable development. Then Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
Kofi Annan, defined human security in the context of civil wars throughout the world: 
 
“In the wake of these conflicts, a new understanding of the concept of security is 
evolving. Once synonymous with the defence of territory from external attack, the 
requirements of security today have come to embrace the protection of communities 
and individuals from internal violence…We must also broaden our view of what is 
meant by peace and security. Peace means much more than the absence of war. 
Human security can no longer be understood in purely military terms. Rather, it must 
encompass economic development, social justice, environmental protection, 
democratization, disarmament, and respect for human rights and the rule of law.”7 
 
Although criticized for its overly vague and all-encompassing underpinnings,8 the people-
centered and intra-state focus of Human Security propelled both concepts of individual safety 
and community integrity on to the security agenda within broader discussions about human 
rights, peace and sustainable development. Among the components of a human security 
agenda were various policy initiatives that focused attention on safety of the individual man, 
woman and child as opposed to exclusive focus on the national security of the territorial 
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boundaries of the state. Ultimately, human security broadened the concept of security and 
integrated its soft precepts into the lives of human beings around the world. 
 
(2) Asymmetrical Warfare: 
Like human security, the concept of asymmetrical warfare has also sought to better 
understand the contemporary realities and complexities of international conflict.9 The concept 
of asymmetrical warfare can be traced to Carl von Clausewitz’s theory of guerrilla warfare 
expressed in his lectures on small war at the War College in 1810 and 1811.10 More recently, 
the discussion about asymmetrical conflict was reinvigorated by the 1975 article in World 
Politics by  Andrew J.R. Mack entitled “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars”. Mack 
illustrated the inapplicability of material power in cases where significant disparity in power 
exists between parties to the conflict.11 The American military took particular interest in this 
concept after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. 
 
In practice, asymmetrical warfare involves small and lightly equipped attacks against points 
of weakness in an otherwise stronger opponent by unorthodox means including ambush, 
kidnapping, sniper fire, bombing, human shields and psychological warfare.12 Asymmetrical 
warfare is a factor in the broader understanding of military and security threats as social and 
political threats in current conflicts being waged.13 Inter-state wars have increasingly given 
way to intra-state wars, civil wars and violence waged by non-state and ostensibly civilian 
actors as in the cases of Bosnia, Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq, Rwanda, Sudan, Libya and 
currently Syria. Retired American Air Force Colonel, Chester Richards captures the new 
character of war: “No longer are there definable battlefields or fronts. Indeed, the distinction 
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between civilian and military ceases to exist”.14 This new reality breaks with traditional fault 
lines for conflict dominated by the Napoleonic tradition of the 18th-19th Centuries with its 
offensive combat, decisive battle, and projection of force. By way of contrast, modern warfare 
no longer squares off conventional field forces. States are pitted in low intensity conflict 
theaters in opposition to anonymous belligerents with neither uniform nor insignia who 
frequent and employ public institutions to develop their values and use unconventional tactics 
and weapons to target innocents – men, women and children – as they go about their daily 
lives. 
 
Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr. suggests explaining asymmetric threats by the most basic 
asymmetry of all: disparity of interest.15 While western industrial democracies increasingly 
suffer from low voter turnout, political apathy, and decreased party affiliations, zealots 
operate as if the very survival of their fundamental belief systems, and thus their lives, are at 
stake. Individuals acting on their own have found in terrorism a propitious venue to 
operationalize their ideological, psychological, and criminal motivations. With dedication and 
the will to act, radicalized individuals can trump public policies geared towards inclusion, 
diversity and good government.  
 
To some degree, human security was eclipsed by 9/11 and the subsequent “war on terror” as 
expressed through punitive policy measures at home and abroad. However, its precepts are 
more meaningful today than ever before in the asymmetrical conflicts currently being waged. 
Lone actor terrorism by radicalized individuals is the most asymmetrical war of all. It is a war 
of one individual or small group against society at large. It may be a fight against government 
or military personnel and symbols, but lone actor terrorism clearly harms innocent civilians 
and the routine functioning of their daily lives. To truly engage with this phenomenon, 
contemporary approaches to counter-terrorism must necessarily alter the level of analysis 
from the traditional “high politics” of statecraft and war to the “low politics” of economics 
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and social welfare. Targeting the “hearts and minds” of potentially radicalize-able individuals 
involves integrating communities more comprehensively into the democratic process, 
hopefully before violent behavior has taken place. However, suspects are contacted at many 
points on the spectrum of radicalization-to-violence in order to alter their cognitive 
frameworks away from violent behaviors and towards a law-abiding mentality.  
 
Part III – Social Dimensions of Counter-Terrorism 
 
Counter-Terrorism and Liberal Democracy: 
Counter-terrorism in liberal democratic societies faces many challenges. The first challenge 
concerns the free flow of information and accompanying prospects for radicalization. 
Renowned terrorist expert Brian Jenkins defines radicalization as "the process of adopting for 
oneself or inculcating in others a commitment not only to a system of [radical] beliefs, but to 
their imposition on the rest of society”.16 In practice, the radicalization process tends to be 
gradual, with beliefs and habits changing slowly over time until the point of “consolidation”.17 
The radicalized individual nurtures an “insular world view that is capable of developing 
rationalizations to refute any counter-arguments”.18 Open telecommunications can promote 
radicalized viewpoints as conflicts transition from the international arena into the politics of 
the home country. Social media has ensured that dissemination of ideas no longer has 
geographical limits.  
 
Certainly, freedom of thought and expression are essential pillars of democratic society. 
Individuals expressing radical viewpoints do not constitute a problem in and of themselves. 
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Pluralist democracies have long offered legitimate space for unconventional and anti-
establishment views to the point where civil disobedience and political protest have become 
an acceptable part of the political process. Protest has long been characterized as a legitimate 
form of democratic expression.  
 
However, at the same time, advantage of these basic rights and liberties can be taken to incite 
violence and anti-democratic values. The capacity of states to avoid getting embroiled in 
international conflicts is decreasing proportional to the increase and availability of 
information about these conflicts. States must balance a society’s “access to information” with 
the kinds of harm this information may engender. Today, with one click of the keyboard, 
anybody can access an online edifice of alternative information to what they have access to at 
home. Terrorist groups have become particular active in direct marketing via social media – 
“soliciting participants among local citizenry”.19 However, radicalized individuals don’t need 
to join any group to support terrorism. They can raise funds, acquire weapons, network with 
likeminded individuals from around the world, learn, and imitate the acts of their predecessors 
from materials and statements posted online. This process of radicalization lies outside the 
democratic process and hurts the very society that protects the rights of citizens, i.e., the 
majority, minorities and the radicals themselves. Whether it takes the form of intimidation or 
extreme fear, the resultant social injury undermines the religious pluralism and political 
liberties democracies seek to uphold, including the very fundamental beliefs systems from 
which terrorism draws for its use.20  
 
As a result, states may impinge more heavily on their citizens during counter-terrorism 
campaigns, admonishing them to cede freedoms and protections to provide leverage in 
pursuing violent subjects.21 On one hand, counterterrorist campaigns have designated powers 
of preventative arrest and racial profiling, which have been seriously criticized by proponents 
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of religious pluralism. On the other hand, attempts by the state to censor or even monitor the 
free flow of information threatens privacy laws and freedoms long established by and for 
everybody else. Deliberate suspension or limitation of civil liberty on the grounds of 
expediency can play into the hands of terrorists by eliciting an overreaction by government 
and thus increasing the anger and frustration of potential recruits. This is particularly the case 
with Muslim communities selected for partnerships with the police and intelligence services 
in rights-based cultures who already feel threatened by the broader political context of 
Islamophobia. Governments consistently balance this tenuous binary between public safety 
and political liberty.  
  
Radicalization to Violence in Communities: 
Of the significant threats to the human security of Canadians today is home grown terrorism. 
Lone actor terrorists commit violence after having undergone a process of radicalization-to-
violence. As a result, the challenge of counter-terrorism is less an object of waging attacks 
against enemies and more about determining the root causes of violent behavior in society. 
This allows the state to intervene earlier in the process of radicalization-to-violence by 
seeking to rectify extremist narratives of individuals, offer alternative cognitive frameworks 
and provide support, in any way support can be given to an individual in crisis. 
 
As home grown terrorists increasingly target random and innocent civilians, governments 
have “logically shifted” their efforts to focus on prevention within the framework of broad-
based, public-private-government partnerships.22 This multidimensional strategy involves 
transferring in part, the role of counter-terrorism to communities, who they claim, are better 
positioned to root out radicalized individuals. These same persons are more often than not, 
recognized community members who have families, friends and associates familiar with their 
ongoing political transformations. Friends and family play a critical role in countering violent 
extremism. 23 This logic has generated a multitude of new ideas about counter-terrorism 
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including “deradicalization”, “community resilience”, “civilianization of security24” and 
“reintegration”. 
 
In hindsight, events leading up to an attack are often replete with clues, information, 
warnings, and indicators of the process by which an individual radicalizes-to-violence.25 
Assistant Commissioner Kevin Brosseau of the RCMP in Winnipeg has found that “with all 
people radicalized to violence, somebody else has known.”26 The key then is for the state to 
make meaningful inroads into society to approach those close to the person under suspicion, 
such as friends, family, community members and others, and act upon that information in a 
way that is procedurally fair and conducive to deradicalization.27 This controversial strategy 
involves employing the family as a “source of information and intelligence”, which may or 
may not be perceived as legitimate depending on the particular circumstances of the 
intervention.28 
 
Canada became a specific target of terrorism at the start of 2015, when ISIS spokesman Abu 
Muhammad al-Adnani urged his followers to attack Canadians over the Conservative 
government’s decision to join the anti-ISIS coalition.29 He called upon extremists and other 
“disbelieving” Western countries to “target the crusaders in their own lands and wherever 
they are found.” Al-Adnani specifically counselled to use explosives, guns, knives, cars, rocks 
“or even a boot or a fist.”30 In other words, no social space is immune from terrorist threat. 
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Important to consider therefore, are the social dimensions of terrorism and counter-terrorism 
and the nature of their effects on local communities. Democracy relies on multiculturalism, 
tolerance, reform, security and peace to provide the foundations for a society to function 
smoothly. While terrorism fails to produce high casualty rates, it serves to destabilize the very 
political institutions, identities and symbols that uphold the values of a liberal democratic 
society. The important point is that asymmetrical terrorism results from a process of 
radicalization that can occur within democratic society itself, but which ends up rejecting 
every democratic value that allows for its conditions of existence. For example, freedom of 
speech provides adherents with the right to say what they want and yet the content of that 
speech may generate hate and incite violence.  
 
The 2014 terrorist attacks in Canada, including such analogous cases as the Boston marathon 
bombing in 2013, the attacks in Norway in 2011, and the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris in 
early 2015, show that perpetrators are ideologically motivated by distorted and violent 
interpretations of acceptable political doctrines. Previously studied cases of lone actor 
terrorists showed individuals affiliated with white supremacism, right-wing extremism, and 
anti-abortion activism. The claim of today’s lone actor terrorists to represent other religious, 
ethnic or racially motivated identities generally defies the interpretations of that identity by 
the wider community. Violent Muslim Jihadists, in particular, are vehemently scorned by 
mainstream Muslim communities even though they may share the same political grievances 
over such things as Western imperialism, military attacks in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan and 
resulting Muslim casualties.  
 
The significant and distinguishing factor between a miniscule minority of perpetrators against 
the vast majority of average faithful is the willingness to commit violence against innocent 
people. This difference should not be underestimated. The perpetrators of recent attacks 
frequented politico-religious institutions in Canada, the United States, Norway and France but 
deviated significantly at the outer limits of the law. Recent terrorists operated, for the most 
part, on their own, disconnected from established political groupings, thus making it nearly 
impossible for the state to prevent the act. Robert Imre has argued that “modern and 
postmodern bureaucracies are very limited in their capacity to deal with the terrorist 
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phenomenon”.31 Locating the problem of terrorism in ideas, individuals and communities 
rather than the institutionalized political process begs radically new strategies of engagement 
for the liberal democratic state.  
 
 
 
 
The politics and psychology of “Lone Actors”: 
A majority of the current generation of Islamist terrorists is generally known to have “had no 
direct link to any terrorist organization and did not attend any terrorist training”.32 The fact of 
individuals acting in their own right is a concept that coincides with the nature of 
contemporary forms of terrorist organization (or disorganization for that matter).  As opposed 
to the hierarchical structures of armed forces and police, terrorists are increasingly adopting 
the ideology but not the political organization of known terrorist groups. With Internet and 
social media, there is more opportunity for politics to be expressed without any form of 
leadership whatsoever. For violent opponents of the state, there is no longer a need for the 
“critical mass” historically engendered by guerrilla warfare. Instead, terrorist planning can be 
an isolated and individual process, resulting entirely from entrepreneurial indoctrination. The 
right mindset replaces organization as the key to terrorism, creating opportunities for what has 
been called “leaderless resistance”.33 Peaceful grassroots movements such as Occupy and Idle 
No More represent this new type of horizontal politics. The same levelled organization works 
equally for violent behavior.  
 
Without leaders and hierarchy, terrorists are unencumbered and more difficult to trace. 
Counter terrorist campaigns face the frugality and ease by which recent terrorist acts have 
been perpetrated. While governments and organizations like Interpol focus on the macro 
threats of nuclear, chemical and biological terrorism, lone actor terrorists increasingly use 
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guns, knives and other light weapons, which can be purchased off the Internet. Kevin 
Brosseau, Assistant Commissioner and Commanding Officer of the RCMP in Winnipeg 
articulated the problem of dealing with radicalized individuals when compared to organized 
groups: 
 
We are good at criminal organizations like outlaw motorcycle gangs. They have 
hierarchical networks; they dress the same. But this is different. Most are individuals 
with no criminal record.34 
The task of fighting terrorists has increasingly been reoriented from military to law 
enforcement and from law enforcement to community. Since the roots of terrorist activity are 
progressively internal, in domestic communities rather than international zones of conflict, it 
falls on that arm of the state involved in monitoring violent and/or criminal activity. Police 
and the criminal justice system are involved in the closest encounters with community 
members operating on the margins of the law. Now that terrorism has been clearly 
criminalized in domestic legislation, police are better equipped than armed forces to engage in 
community collaborations.35 However, this task has been the focus of community policing 
efforts which network with residents to solve their problems together. In addition to police 
and the criminal justice system, a range of “helping professions” like psychiatrists, 
psychologists, educators and religious mentors are becoming an additional source of expertise 
on lone actor terrorists.36  
 
An additional and important consideration in countering the violent extremism of lone actors 
is the potential significance of mental illness. The recent attacks on Canadian soldiers in 
Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu and Canada’s National War Memorial in 2014 demonstrate that 
terrorism is not solely or even necessarily ideological, particularly in relation to the 
backgrounds of lone actors. Although there is no common terrorist profile, investigation in to 
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the backgrounds of Martin Rouleau-Couture and Michael Zehaf-Bibeau for example, reveals 
histories of mental illness, criminality and drug abuse. A friend recounted his conversation in 
the kitchen where Zehaf-Bibeau spoke of psychosis and suspicions that the devil was after 
him.37 Individuals suffering from borderline personality or bipolar disorders can break with 
reality completely to engage in fantasy worlds in which their own impulsive or psychotic 
behaviors may seem normal to them.38 With their social ineffectiveness and alienation, 
personality disorders may fail to integrate in to the strict operational frameworks of organized 
terrorism. However, the identity struggles they entail, along with isolation from family and 
society, can generate propitious circumstances for adoption of a radical ideology that gives 
meaning to an otherwise meaningless life. Framing problems according to a “high minded 
narrative” like struggling against an oppressor gives unacceptable behavior and thoughts new 
meaning.39 This is not to suggest causality between mental illness and violence. As Kevin 
Brosseau, Assistant Commissioner of the RCMP warned: 
 
Many in our profession jump to the connection to people suffering mental health 
issues. Those will be the ones to radicalize. But I’m not so confident to draw a 
correlative relationship. It’s hard to generalize, generalizations don’t exist.40  
 
The threat of this type of political violence stems from the combination of radical ideology 
and action. And in spite of longstanding and heated debate, some authors would add 
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psychopathology as an additional ingredient.41 The implication for counterterrorism is that 
military, intelligence and police must increasingly coordinate, albeit in a cautious manner, 
with mental health systems and perhaps even addiction programs to intercept destabilized 
suspects who also express a radicalized ideological viewpoint.  
 
The psychologist’s potential contribution to combatting extremism was noted by the Canadian 
Psychological Association (CPA), which established in 2009 a Section on 
Extremism/Terrorism as part of its overall mandate.42 The professional training of psychology 
in radicalization and recruitment, leader-follower relations, personality variables and social 
network analysis places psychologists in an opportune position to engage in preventative 
treatment of radicalized persons through individual and group counselling. Dr. David 
Nussbaum, Chair of the CPA Section for the Study of Extremism and Terrorism describes his 
home base as an “ideal intellectual home” for professionals with scholarly credentials who 
seek to better understand radicalization and deradicalization. As an academic and empirical 
discipline, psychology has “followed the requisite signposts in producing explanatory 
explanations that can be supported or perhaps more importantly refuted by evidence”.43  
 
Deradicalization versus Disengagement: 
There is, as yet, no consensus about the proper definition of deradicalization. Urging clarity in 
counter-terrorism initiatives, Horgan, currently working at the Global Studies Institute and 
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Department of Psychology at Georgia State University, suggests distinguishing between 
deradicalization and disengagement. Disengagement from terrorism, he states, may or may 
not involve critical cognitive or social transformation, i.e., deradicalization. Those who leave 
terrorism behind may abandon the “shared social norms, values, attitudes and aspirations”44 of 
the violent group, but they may also continue to hold these views while no longer 
participating in direct terrorist operations.  
 
Disengagement from terrorist actions does not eradicate the grievances extremist individuals 
adopt during their journey towards radicalization. Disengaged terrorists may continue to 
support terrorism in indirect ways such as fundraising or promoting radical ideologies online. 
Furthermore, terrorism and its underlying grievances may continue to have a social or 
psychological hold on the individual long after the violent behavior has been repudiated and 
abandoned.45 In other words, disengagement from terrorism does not necessarily involve a 
change in political attitudes, i.e., deradicalization. Refuting radical views is difficult given that 
individuals often believe that they are acting in the interests of a higher power. As Dr. Wagdy 
Loza, former Chief psychologist at Kingston Penitentiary and expert on disengagement has 
argued “it is extremely hard because you’re going to challenge somebody who has the 
unshakeable belief that they are doing this for God”.46 Practitioners may successfully 
challenge an individual’s interpretation of faith or scripture. The individual may even 
renounce violence. But terrorists generally perceive their acts as part of a broader and 
legitimate struggle.  As Alex Wilner, senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies in 
Zurich, Switzerland and renowned expert in prison radicalization attests, “Terrorists do not 
consider themselves as mere criminals but rather as foot soldiers in a global and cosmic 
conflict…. We need to be careful not to ignore the political, ideological and, in some cases, 
religious motivations” of terrorists.47 The ultimate goal, according to John Horgan and Mary 
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Beth Altier, is to “cultivate a shared sense of victimization” and identify “pro-social ways of 
expressing the acknowledged and legitimate grievances” outside a punitive framework.48  
 
Formulating a viable approach to countering the extremist views of individuals is a delicate 
quandary for practitioners of counter-terrorism given that radical cognition is both a 
legitimate freedom of thought and expression in rights-based cultures, and an immediate 
precursor to violent behavior. This is the recognized “gray zone” between free speech and 
violence. Horgan has argued against any causal link between the two processes, i.e., extremist 
views and extremist behaviors.49 A disengaged terrorist’s propensity for repentance depends, 
instead, on the specific circumstances in which the disengagement took place, point in the 
process of radicalization-to-violence that the individual was intercepted by authorities, 
whether it was voluntary or involuntary, an individual or collective process, and the broader 
social circumstances surrounding the abandonment of terrorist activity. Disengagement is 
ultimately a “narrow” approach to deradicalization which parts company with broader 
approaches targeting ideology as well. Circumstances may be sufficient to implore terrorists 
to renounce violence while not necessarily targeting the ideology that supported violence in 
the first place, although this represents an ongoing debate. These facets of deradicalization 
prompt new understandings of the relationship between counter-terrorism and the broader 
society in which it occurs.   
 
Part IV –Countering Violent Extremism in Canada: 
Canada lags behind other countries like the United Kingdom’s Channel program, with its 
decades-long experience with Irish Republican Army (IRA) fighters, Germany’s experience 
fighting neo-Nazis and other hate groups or authoritarian regimes such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia 
and Singapore in their longstanding and respective wars against terror and domestic 
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opponents.50 However, as the threat of home grown terrorism becomes better understood, 
Canada has responded with integrated strategies that incorporate all levels of government and 
civil society as stakeholders.  
 
Growing awareness of the social dimensions of radicalization and deradicalization has led 
many governments to intervene earlier in the process of radicalization. Like Channel, 
Canada’s terror prevention program will focus on those who haven’t yet committed an 
offence or joined a group abroad. It also involves working, for the most part, with troubled 
youth, an area which many social groups (schools, police, community centers, mosques) have 
much experience with already.  
 
However, countering violence extremism in the social realm presupposes government 
offloading of formerly bureaucratic functions associated with security and intelligence to 
citizens. This approach thus prompts new understandings of state—society relations and 
targeting of resources and personnel in countering violent extremism. Extrapolating from the 
British case, Krzysztof Feliks Sliwinski proposes the term “civilianization” as the arena of 
“non-military, voluntary organizations and the business/private sector, engaged by 
government but acting in their own right to prevent, protect and prepare in the context of a 
counter-terrorism strategy”.51 Indeed, governments have increasingly sought to share the 
burden of security with ordinary civilians who are given the “responsibility to act” on their 
own initiatives. “Families and community groups are the foundation of a safe and resilient 
Canada. Everyone plays a part in keeping our communities safe”.52  
 
Over the last twenty years, the concept of “community resilience” has been incorporated into 
urban planning models aimed at protecting cities while at the same time promoting greater 
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civic engagement in government practices, particularly relating to emergency preparedness. 
Writing about the “public city” in Europe, Jon Coaffee and Peter Rogers use Manchester, UK 
between 1996 and 2006 as a case study of new forms of securitization that rely on the citizens 
taking greater responsibility for their personal risk management.53  
 
Canada has yet to administer a comprehensive strategy for countering violent extremism at 
home.54 Since 9/11, Canada’s most high-profile case of homegrown terrorism was the 
infamous Toronto 18, an al-Qaeda-inspired group of 18 terrorists who plotted against targets 
in metropolitan Toronto and Southern Ontario in 2006 and a miscellany of other isolated 
individuals whose plots were foiled or who were killed in combat.55 Therefore, while 
Canadian deradicalization programs are in their infancy, much effort has been invested in 
development of appropriate intervention strategies to counter future threats. However, as 
outlined in its counter-terrorism policy, the prevention component stands to play a key role. 
Prevention means targeting an individual before he/she engages in violent activity. In other 
words, the focus is on an individual’s extremist attitudes rather than behavior. Civil society 
organizations have initiated their own programs designed to alter the ideologies and behaviors 
of potentially radicalize-able individuals. The plethora of approaches as it now stands, is 
underwritten by serious debate in Canadian politics about terrorism and counter-terrorism and 
the urgent and recognized need for definitional and operational clarity. Much like terrorism, 
there is no consensus about what deradicalization means. In common usage, deradicalization 
is an attitudinal shift among those with extremist views towards adoption of more moderate 
views. To what extent is altering attitudes a possible or desirable goal in an open and 
democratic society fighting terrorist threats? How do such strategies play out in a country that 
has been engaged militarily with violent extremists abroad for over 15 years against the 
background of growing Islamophobia and increasing powers to police and the criminal-justice 
system to profile, survey, and prosecute suspected terrorists at home? 
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Programs currently underway in Canada approach the problem of violent extremism with 
different administrators from different professional backgrounds and expertise, employing 
different philosophies and targeting interventions on different points on the spectrum of 
radicalization-to-violence. 
 
 The first issue is what organization and expertise are brought to bear in countering violent 
extremism. Canada has many government-originated mandates, most of which function 
through partnerships between police, the criminal-justice system, and civil society. 
Alternatively, civil society has produced its own programs, through mosques, educational 
institutions and other voluntary organizations.  
 A second issue is the underlying ideology behind the program. Is the goal to change a 
radicalized person’s view or a radicalized person’s behavior? Whether the goal is 
deradicalization or disengagement, there must be additional clarity about whether the 
discussion will take a political, social, cognitive, theological or crime-prevention focus. 
 A third issue is whether the program’s goal is to prevent radicalization in the first place, 
deal with it once it has occurred, or seek to rehabilitate political criminals by disengaging 
them from violent behavior after the fact.  
 
The following section introduces and critically evaluates the spectrum of programs to counter 
violent extremism currently underway in Canada. 
 
IV: Countering Violent Extremism in Canada – Programs and Approaches: 
Canada’s official counter-terrorism strategy was outlined in a 2013 document entitled 
“Building Resilience against Terrorism”.56 The policy is comprehensive and 
multidimensional, consisting of four mutually reinforcing dimensions: (1) prevent, (2) detect, 
(3) deny and (4) respond. The latter three areas seek to identify terrorists through policing and 
intelligence, deny them the means and opportunities to pursue terrorist activities by legislating 
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CT, cutting off support, and responding rapidly and proportionally through the criminal-
justice system to convict and eventually reintegrate terrorists back into society and prompt as 
quick a return to routine life as possible.57 These targeted strategies cater to individuals 
located at any point on the spectrum from pre-radicalization vulnerability through the 
radicalization-to-violence process, and extending to prospects for prison radicalization, 
recidivism and potential reintegration back into society as law-abiding citizens.58  
 
 Canada’s approach to building resilience against terrorism relies on “partnerships”, including 
not only the Government of Canada but “all levels of government, law enforcement agencies, 
the private sector and citizens”.59 In fact, Canada has identified 21 government agencies 
mandated to take part in CT.60 In the areas of detection, denial and response, the criminal-
justice system and intelligence services have the most appropriate skill-sets and expertise to 
gather information on and apprehend suspects in cases where there is clear evidence that 
violence will occur or has occurred already. “This mission is principally implemented through 
the investigative activities of the RCMP-led Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams 
(INSETs) based in Vancouver, Toronto, Ottawa and Montreal, the RCMP-only National 
Security Enforcement Sections (NSES) in every other province and the Border Integrity 
Program”.61 The mandate of INSETs is to facilitate increased collaboration among 
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government agencies, to collect, share and analyze intelligence and enhance enforcement 
capacity to combat national security threats.62  
 
The “prevent” element of Canada’s CT has received much fanfare and criticism in recent 
years. “There is an emergent consensus among counterterrorism analysts and practitioners 
that to defeat the threat posed by Islamist extremism and terrorism, there is a need to go 
beyond security and intelligence measures, taking proactive measures to prevent vulnerable 
individuals from radicalizing and rehabilitating those who have already embraced 
extremism.63 As decentralized and diverse as the terrorist threat may be, counter-terrorism has 
been formulated as equally decentralized and diverse. Processes of radicalization and 
deradicalization occur in the most closely framed encounters between citizens and the state. 
For this reason, police services and other first responders have the most experience in dealing 
with violence and extremist behavior in communities. However, police can only succeed with 
broad public support. Canada has a long history of community policing and its approach to 
public safety involves promoting peace, rights and good governance.64 For this reason, the 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), charged with national security law enforcement, 
and the Ministry of Public Safety have taken the lead. Both institutions have histories of 
ongoing collaboration with civil society. 
 
Of all the provincial police services, Calgary’s Police have been touted as the most advanced 
in efforts to educate, raise awareness and prevent the radicalization of young people through 
its ReDirect program. ReDirect was announced on September 15, 2015 as a new program 
aimed at countering radicalization as opposed to deradicalization. The trajectory of ReDirect, 
according to Sgt. Paul Dunn, concerns “getting at youth before they are radicalized”.65 The 
Calgary Police already has a significantly large youth services section with two special 
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programs running for 7-8 years: the Multi-Agency School Support Team (MASST) and the 
Youth At Risk Development (YARD). Based on strong state-society partnerships built up 
over time the Calgary Police Services is well positioned to build on past efforts to engage 
legitimately in the larger community. For now, ReDirect receives phone calls or appeals via 
an online referral process for clients who are concerned about vulnerable persons, generally 
loved ones. After contact is made, ReDirect conducts an individual assessment of the person’s 
background, family and any other relevant information.66 “We are looking for vulnerabilities 
and needs of the person, and the issues in life we can help out with and add resources to. It is 
still in process”.67  
 
With the national Terrorism Prevention Program delayed, several civil society groups in 
Canada initiated their own programs aimed at countering violent extremism. It is logical to 
assume that those closest to radicalized individuals are best placed to identify suspicious 
behavior in the family or the community, at work or at the mosque. The goal then is for 
citizens, community organizations and other social networks to be proactive and pass along 
that information to the proper authorities in ways that are supportive rather than punitive. 
 
Community groups in Canada have thus taken it upon themselves to educate the public, 
provide social services and liaise with government agencies. One area in which community 
groups have taken the initiative is by volunteering to train their own members on issues of 
deradicalization. Daniel Koehler, Director of the German Institute on Radicalization and 
Deradicalization (GIRDS) has conducted hundreds of workshops and lectures on 
deradicalization around the world in the last four years. His institute specializes in training of 
deradicalization professionals, evaluation of programs and counseling of governments to 
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design deradicalization initiatives.68 Through training workshops, Koehler draws from his 
own educational background in e-learning with the use of test exercises and case studies. The 
curriculum of his week-long workshops focusses on the psychology of radicalization, jihadi 
ideology, case management, risk analysis, evaluation, etc.”69 Another initiative worthy of 
mention is Extreme Dialogue, an organization established, designed and organized by the 
British Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) with Christianne Boudreau as partner. Boudreau, 
a native of Calgary, experienced first-hand, the tragedy of losing her own son, Damian 
Claremont, who died in January of 2014 fighting with Jabhat al-Nusra, an al-Qaeda-affiliated 
rebel group consisting of largely foreign extremists in Syria. Extreme Dialogue has mounted a 
website with information, videos and resources that spread the personal stories of 
radicalization-to-violence as told by affected families and individuals.70 
 
Koehler was approached to deliver two full training courses in Canada for staff of both the 
Islamic Social Services Association (ISSA) based in Winnipeg and the Hayat Canada Family 
Support Foundation based in Calgary.71 ISSA was established in 1999 as a “charitable and 
voluntary organization” under the directorship of Shahina Siddiqui to support Muslims in 
Canada through public advocacy and personal counselling.72 Christianne Boudreau also co-
launched Hayat Canada with Daniel Koehler to target family counselling and outreach 
specifically for family or friends of persons in radical Islamic groups or who are clearly 
heading towards violent Islamic radicalization, including those traveling to Syria and other 
conflict zones. The education and training provided by Hayat Canada are based on partnering 
with different agencies, and serving as a “bridge between family and all institutions relevant 
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(e.g. police, courts, employers, schools, social services)”.73  However, and importantly, 
Hayat’s approach is to “strengthen the family as a counterforce against radicalization in an 
equal partnership with the support provider and not on using the family as a source of 
information or intelligence for the authorities”.74  
 
Canada’s deradicalization programs intervene in the most personal and emotional aspects of 
family relationships. But they have grown organically out of the very communities they serve 
and thus have strong cultural, religious, linguistic and social tools to help families suffering 
the devastating process of dealing with troubled youth and wanting to reintegrate them back 
into their lives after engaging in extremism and/or violence. Writing on the family support 
role of Hayat Canada, Daniel Koehler illustrates three necessary levels of any deradicalization 
strategy: the pragmatic level, the affective level, and the ideological level. According to 
Koehler, the pragmatic dimension of deradicalization focuses on disengagement and the 
practical needs of the individual to achieve alternative goals, providing capacity building, job 
training, drug treatment, family therapy and other practical assistance necessary to discontinue 
the old and start a new life.”75 The affective level addresses the individual’s need for 
emotional support and requirement to establish alternative “reference groups” and attachment 
figures, which is accomplished through family counselling. The ideological level involves 
“discrediting” of extremist ideologies by offering more nuanced views and alternative 
understandings.76 Koehler believes this is the appropriate combination of ideas to promote 
successful deradicalization. 
 
Finally, Canada is home to several faith-based programs that seek to counter violent 
extremism by incorporating theological discussions into the intervention process. Trained 
imam and former police chaplain, Muhammad Shahied Shaikh (with the help of Mohammed 
Robert Heft) established a legendary program at the Al-Noor Mosque in Toronto that offers a 
12-step detox for young would-be radicals. Modelled on the prototype of Alcoholics 
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Anonymous, the detox program treats extremism like it would alcoholism or other 
addictions.77  
 
Both alcoholism and fanaticism have similar effects…. Those addicted to alcohol are 
locked within a certain thinking pattern that makes them rely on alcohol. The same 
applies to extremists who can only think about events around them in one way.78   
 
The 12-steps promote recovery by the same approach that leads alcoholics to give up drinking 
alcohol. At times, this involves medical and psychological treatment, which may end in a 
script for prescription medications.  
 
Most of the 12 steps are pitched at the level of theology. Theological discussions aim to 
promote less rigid, less literal interpretations of Islam, seeking common ground instead when 
thinking about Allah, Mohammad, his Companions, Islamic scholarship and other Abrahamic 
and non-Abrahamic faiths. Moderate theology aims to retain the Muslim’s identity while 
promoting Canada’s open society. Masjid Al-Noor’s program treats extremism like it would 
any other harmful dependency by seeking to alter patterns of thought and behavior that are 
deemed harmful and building the appeal of an alternative framework of religious observance 
that supports traditional interpretations of the Islamic faith. Traditional Islam, as practiced by 
a majority of the world’s Muslims, completely rejects suicide bombings and extremism.79 
 
Mohammed Robert Heft, himself a convert to Islam of German and Irish background, has 
mounted a parallel program to counter violent extremism in Canada based on Da’wah 
(Islamic preaching) and community outreach. Although not trained as an imam, Heft prefers 
to describe himself as a “preacher”, who came to Islam from a troubled background, having 
encountered people from different walks of life and places, including a brief sojourn in Iraq 
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after being recruited by extremists to protest the American war in 2003 and act as human 
shield.80 Upon return to Canada in 2004, Heft established the Paradise Forever (P4E) Islamic 
Centre in Toronto. Paradise Forever is a community organization that specializes in 
supporting newly converted Muslims and protecting them from being manipulated by 
extremist misrepresentations of Quranic teachings. Heft explains that his outreach seeks to 
counter what he calls “do-it-yourself-Islam”.81 P4E provides an assortment of services that 
includes counseling, psychotherapy, addiction counselling, mental health support and a range 
of financial and social services.82 Since 2009, Heft has expanded his involvement in 
counseling youth at risk of radicalization with the development of a 3-step detox program.83 
The program involves (1) theological detox, (2) social support and (3) community 
accountability. The three areas are mutually constitutive given that subjects can only undergo 
cognitive changes if they have practical support, whether that involves finding employment, 
getting off welfare, establishing more stable relationships, or finding peace within. 
 
The theological dimension seeks to engage at a level that extremists understand, i.e., 
scriptures, fatwas, hadith. The rationale is to discover from what sources the extremists 
acquired their religious knowledge to begin with and then correct any misconceptions. “Many 
are reading the Qu’ran like a ‘choose your own adventure’ story, which involves interpreting 
for oneself what biblical stories are relevant and then acting on their teachings out of context.  
 
They are re-applying the utopian understanding that never did exist. Their 
interpretations are inconsistent with over 1,400 years of Islamic history and 
jurisprudence. Their religion is fueled by their frustrations: disunity in the Islamic 
Umma (nation), the Arab-Israeli conflict and the violence going on in the Middle East. 
But Islam does not come back from killing people. It happens in the home. It is about 
being kind and caring towards your loved ones.84  
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In other words, Heft tries to integrate theological discussions about Islam with humanistic 
understandings of faith and the family along with broader and more accepting approaches to 
community. Heft’s program has been credited by the RCMP and other Canadian policing 
agencies for helping many youths escape the destructive state of radicalization.85  
 
Detox programs have been met with mixed reviews. Described as “deeply problematic” by 
Muhammad Fadel, Associate Professor & Research Chair for the Law and Economics of 
Islamic Law at the University of Toronto, Faculty of Law, the concern is that “we as a 
community cannot be responsible for the conduct of individual Muslims”.86 Seen in this way, 
community accountability can be misinterpreted as a means to simplify and repudiate the 
diversity within Islam and identify Muslim communities at large by their most extremist 
elements. This attitude is the very root of Islamophobia and all racisms.  
 
Funding is also an ongoing challenge. Many grassroots organisations like the Islamic Services 
Association (ISSA), are urging the government to provide them more resources. Koehler’s 
main criticism of the Canadian context to date is lack of government support for the few 
initiatives that are taking place on the ground.87 However, Heft insists that government 
support can impede work at the grassroots level: “The government should step aside and not 
fund grassroots efforts. They don’t understand the nuances”.88 Against the background of 
Islamophobia, conspiracy-laden ideas, and paranoia in the “war on terror”, there is a need to 
improve relations between Muslim communities and Canadian society and government. 
Therefore, the extent to which the state should intervene in deradicalization represents an 
ongoing debate among different stakeholders, both governmental and non-governmental. 
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Finally, detox must be understood within its broader political context. As voiced by Shadaab 
H. Rahemtulla, a Canadian doctoral student from Toronto in Middle Eastern and Islamic 
History at Oxford University: “it fails to address the root cause of militant activity, which is 
growing frustration with American imperialism within the Muslim world”.89 Canada’s 
involvement in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and ongoing support for the State of Israel 
contributes to this highly charged atmosphere in which many Canadian Muslims feel that their 
values and identities are under threat. In the ongoing framework of the “war on terror”, 
Muslim responsibilities are being framed by anti-terror measures.90 As a result, Muslim 
Canadians feel uncomfortable expressing their views for fear of being targeted as other or 
even “un-Canadian”. Thus far, the Canadian government’s progress in developing punitive 
measures through legislation and the criminal-justice system does little to alleviate such fears. 
 
In a liberal democracy, the impetus for changing religious, political and social views must 
originate, at least in part, from within the communities themselves. However, extremism 
affects everybody. The question remains whether deradicalization can occur in the broader 
context of wars on terror, racial profiling, fear, paranoia and conflict. Without trust and 
common ground, Canadian and Muslims societies will not be in the position to heal their rifts 
and promote peaceful co-existence. A telling example of the failure to bridge barriers was 
seen in a joint effort by the Islamic Services Association, the National Council on Canadian 
Muslims and the RCMP to release in Winnipeg a 38-page handbook “United Against 
Terrorism”91 in 2014. The handbook aimed to provide information for young Canadians 
vulnerable to recruitment by extremist groups. The collaboration broke down when the RCMP 
withdrew its support for the booklet on account of its “adversarial tone”.92 The RCMP’s 
decision not to proceed with the initiative shocked their Muslim partners and exemplified the 
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kind of challenges that accompany partnerships between state and society, which in cases like 
these are essentially cross-cultural partnerships. Mutual recognition and understanding will 
require time and trust, attributes that liberal democratic societies aim to achieve through 
multiculturalism and diversity in spite of the difficult challenges they encounter in the face of 
contemporary threats. 
 
Part V: Conclusions: 
This article has established some parameters for studying the social dimensions of counter-
terrorism in Canada. Drawing insight from the concepts of human security and asymmetrical 
warfare, it is useful to alter the level of analysis at which counter-terrorism is understood. 
Moving down from the level of statehood and inter-state conflict to the individual and 
community allows us to better understand the phenomenon of lone actor terrorism. This type 
of violence encapsulates the individual as typically both the perpetrator and the target of 
violence. This type of warfare cannot be analyzed on the basis of conventional indicators of 
power and force alone. Realizing this fact holds crucial implications for public policy.  
 
In spite of their incredible wealth and resources, Western industrialized democracies have 
neither the wherewithal nor the intelligence to defeat the power of terrorism, once and for all. 
Asymmetrical warfare demonstrates that individuals without much power can cause 
considerable damage to modern industrial societies. And human security teaches that civilians 
bear the brunt of this violence. Societies fighting asymmetrical conflict in the form of lone 
actor terrorism experience the violence on a variety of levels and in ways that affect the lives 
of civilians in deeply personal ways. Furthermore, terrorism can no longer be understood as 
either an exclusively ideological or political process. Radicalized agents adopt values from a 
variety of different sources. The process of radicalization is complex and as a result, 
counterterrorism must support moderating forces, alternative and non-violent viewpoints in 
social, religious, civil and even psychological structures. There is no better route to 
understanding lone actors than to speak with the people they have been in touch with, whether 
at the mosque, the church, the hospital or the prison. 
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The principle motivating force behind terrorism today is fanaticism. Democrats have 
difficulty appealing to the hearts and minds of zealotry, which rejects democracy’s very 
essence. Terrorism stems from different combinations of an open society with radical 
indoctrination, possible mental illness and the willingness to commit violence.  Misplaced or 
inappropriate strategies to combat this phenomenon may ultimately reproduce the conditions 
which prompt terrorism in the first place as in cases of state overreaction or overreliance on 
punitive measures. Failure to recognize this fundamental reality of contemporary terrorism 
can only perpetuate and intensify its effects.  
 
The most important question for future research and public policy aimed at countering violent 
extremism is how to discover and prevent future plots. However, the difficulty, if not 
impossibility of this task confronts the idiosyncratic nature of lone actors. For this reason, 
Bakker and de Graaf have suggested focusing not on the terrorist profile but on the “modus 
operandi”.93 Given that all lone actor terrorists learn to be radical, it is necessary to focus on 
the radicalization process itself. The terrorist act is generally a result of spiritual mentoring 
either in person or on the Internet. The need of lone actors for identity and even belonging 
will bring them into contact with other extremists and often people more moderate than their 
selves for guidance. Counterterrorist strategies would benefit from creating stronger links 
with spiritual authorities who preach short of committing violence and monitoring their means 
of communicating with disciples, either in person or on the Internet. It may be useful for 
governments, in collaboration with community groups, to increase a moderate Islamic 
presence online in the overall context of a more inclusive and democratic society. 
 
Studies of terrorism must move from exclusive focus on the national and international level to 
the level of municipal and city governments in conjunction with police, the criminal justice 
system, mental health authorities and social institutions like schools, places of religious 
worship and communities. Only through these linkages will terrorists be separated from the 
average faithful, law abiding citizens enjoying all that liberal democracy has to offer. 
Studying these diverse and at times, disjointed relationships require measures by which to 
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determine success. There is as yet no consensus about the appropriate criteria for 
measurement of either radicalization or deradicalization. Ultimately, countering violent 
extremism in Canada is a new phenomenon that will undergo trial and error on the road 
towards more effective programming against extremism along with changes in foreign policy 
that better reflect Canada’s multicultural society and commitment to public safety and human 
security both at home and abroad. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
